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Stewart: Banks and Banking--Set-Off of Deposit of Insolvent Estate Against
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
almost identical in the material facts, contrary results were reached.
In both cases X was employed to mine coal, and he secured his own
workmen, which the employer paid. The employer also furnished
the equipment. In Waldron v. Coat, Company,1 X was held a
servant. In Rawson v. Coat Company," he was called an independent contractor. In an attempt to distinguish the former case,
the court said that it was distinguishable because the employer assisted in the work, by drilling holes and otherwise, and that X
recognized the authority of the company in the selection of workmen.
In conclusion, it may be said that the principal case is unique
in adopting a single conclusive test, and giving minimum consideration to factors that other cases have held more or less significant.
-AUGUST

BANKS AND BANKING -

W.

PETROPLUS.

SET-OFF OF DEPOSIT OF INSOLVENT

ESTATE AGAINST BANK'S DIsTRmuvE SHARE OF THE EISTATE.-

In a recent case,'1 the administrator de bonis non of an insolvent
estate claimed the right to set-off pro tanto a deposit of funds collected from the assets of the insolvent estate against the bank's
distributive share of the insolvent estate. An action was pending
to determine the claims of the creditors and the amount available
for distribution when the bank closed and when this action was
brought. The court denied a set-off on the ground that the bank
could not have charged the indebtedness against the deposit and
th6 right of a depositor to a set-off is reciprocal to the bank's right
to charge the deposit account. The insolvent estate was required
to pay the bank its distributive share of the estate and the bank
was required to pay the insolvent estate its distributive part of the
bank's assets.
In a dissenting opinion, it is agreed that there is no mutuality
and no right to set-off the deposit against the intestate's debt to the
bank,' but it is contended that upon the insolvency of the intestate,
59 W. Va. 301, 53 S. E. 713 (1906).

1089 W. Va. 426, 109 S. E. 729 (1921).

'7100 W. Va. 263, 130 S. E. 492, 43 A. L. R. 330 (1925).
'Allen v. Holleman, 156 S. E. 446 (S. C. 1931).
2"A bank to which a depositor owes a matured debt may appropriate a

general deposit of the debtor to the payment of the debt; but it has no
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all of the creditors were interested in all the assets of the estate
and were the benficiaries of a trust, created by the deposit and accepted by the bank, and that the administrator of the estate should
withhold payments of the dividends to the bank until the deposit
account had been paid,' it being said that to hold otherwise would
give to the bank a greater percentage of the estate's assets than
would go to the other creditors. While rather difficult to reconcile
the dissenting opinion with strict trust doctrine,' still the contention of preference seems to be well founded when the problem presented is worked out mathematically.
Assume that both the bank and the estate pay 25% dividends.
The bank owed the estate $25,000; the estate owed the bank
$77,305.38. Under the majority opinion, the administrator would
owe the bank $13,176.34. Under the dissenting opinion, the administrator would have a pro rata claim to $5,673.66 of the bank's
assets. Overriding the nominal character of the deposit it may be
said that the administrator has already paid the bank $25,000, the
amount of the deposit; therefore, if he pays them an additional
$13,176.34, the bank would receive from the assets of the estate,
$38,176.34, or about 50% of the total indebtedness of $77,305.38,
while the other creditors would receive but 25o.
Had the deposit been that of the intestate set-off would probably have been allowed. It is now generally accepted-that a depositor in an insolvent bank may set-off his deposit therein against
a bona fide indebtedness of his own to the bank,' even where the
debt has not matured.' The reasons given seem to be that the receiver of an insolvent bank takes choses in action subject to any
equitable set-offs which might have been set-off in an action by the
bank, and that a demand of an insolvent bank against a third person is only an asset in so far as there may be a balance due upon
the same after deducting whatever the bank may be owing to the
right to appropriate or apply a deposit made by the depositor for a known
special purpose, or under such special agreement that it may be checked out
Lutz v. Williams, 79 W. Va. 609, 91 S.
or withdrawn for specific purposes."
E. 460 (1917).
3See Gardner v. Chicago Company, 261 U. S. 453, 43 S. Ct. 424, 29 A. L. R.

622 (1923).
'Thus there is not a definite trust res.
' Note (1923) 25 A. L. R. 938.
0Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 36 L. Ed. 1059, 13 S. Ct. 148 (1892);
Williams v. Burgess, 74 W. Va. 623, 82 S. E. 507 (1914); State v. Brobson,
94 Ga. 95, 21 S. E. 146 (1894); see cases cited and reviewed in note (1923)
25 A. L. R. 938.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss3/9

2

Stewart: Banks and Banking--Set-Off of Deposit of Insolvent Estate Against
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
depositor. Seemingly, mutual obligations are balanced as of date
of insolvency.
In some cases where collateral has been given, the reciprocity
rule enunciated in the principal case has been applied to defeat a
set-off," it being said that to allow it would grant a preference. In
other cases,' the courts have failed to make any distinction between situations where collateral has been given and where it has
not. The United States Bankruptcy Law recognizes the right of
set-off in all cases of mutual debts and mutual credits.'
-MELVILL

BILLs AND NOTES-SER&L NOTES--EFFECT

STEWART.

OF PART BEING

DuE.-The defendant was the maker of a series of notes maturing
on successive dates. They arose out of one transaction and were
given for one consideration. The court assumed that such fact
was inferable from the face of the notes. They did not contain acceleration provisions. The plaintiff purchased all the notes after
the first was overdue. Held, under statute,' that the plaintiff took
all the notes with notice that they had been dishonored and the defense was good as to all the notes. Beasley Hardware Company v.
Stevens.2
On the question involved in the principal case there is a conflict of authority.8 Several recent cases,' including Morgan v.
7Prudential Realty Company v. Allen, 241 Mass. 277, 135 N. E. 221, 25 A.
L. R. 935 (1922). Contra: Salladin v. Mitchell, 42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127
(1894).
8
Supra, n. 4.
9 § 68a-' IIn all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate
of a bankrupt and a creditor, the account shall be stated and one debt shall
be set off against the other, and the balance only shall be allowed or paid."
See 2 CoLIER, BANXRUPTCY (13th ed. 1923) 1612.

' GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1926) § 4294.

2155 S. E. 67 (Ga. 1930); Case Comment (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 464.
8
Harrington v. Claflin & Company, 91 Tex. 294, 42 S. W. 1055 (1897);
Ferguson v. Wiede, 46 S. W. 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898); Iowa City Bank v.
Friar, 167 S. W. 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); National State Bank v. Ricketts,
177 S. W. 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Huselby v. Allison, 25 S. W.
(2d) 1108 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Rowe v. Scott, 28 S. Dak. 145, 132 N. W.
695 (1911).
Contra: Boss v. Hewitt, 15 Wis. 285 (1862); Patterson v.
Wright, 64 Wis. 289 (1885); Morgan v. Farmington Coal & Coke Company,
97 W. Va. 83, 124 S. E. 591 (1924); Cable Company v. Bruce, 135 Okla. 170,
274 Pac. 665 (1928); Mountjoy Parts Company v. Bank, 12 S. W. (2d) 609,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
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